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Abstract 
very-Large Scale Systems (VLSS) play a powerful role in shaping what an 
organization does and can do in a practical sense. VLSS are deeply embedded in an 
organization's procedures, business plans, and strategies. These systems evolve over 
long periods of time, often not according to some rational plan, and for a limited 
time they provide a significant competitive advantage over other firms. In the long 
run, however, VLSS become strategic liabilities and must be rebuilt. 
Many organizations experience great difficulty rebuilding VLSS. Indeed, 
most organizations attempt to avoid rebuilding VLSS until the last possible moment. 
Often, the organization is in a state of crisis, a strategic transition. Because of the 
complexity and size of VLSS, existing methodologies often are not helpful. To make 
matters worse, the typical management incentive structure discourages rebuilding 
VLSS. 
In a typical VLSS effort, participants soon discover that they must rebuild the 
organization in order to take full advantage of new technologies. A major 
organizational engineering effort is often required. Senior management as well as 
systems management routinely underestimate the complexity of the task before 
them. Consequently, large errors are made in estimating costs and time. 
Drawing on research in both the private and public sector, this paper 
examines why VLSS fail, why are VLSS so difficult to rebuild, what are the strategy 
options, and how can senior management guide the rebuilding process. 
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About This Research 
The results reported here derive from several different research projects 
which examined the rebuilding of very large scale information systems. In the 
period 1978-1982 I worked as consultant to the Office of Technology Assessment 
(United States Congress) a congressional research agency which advises congress on 
technical subjects. I participated in the assessment of the F'BI's National Crime 
Information Center, and the Internal Revenue Service's Tax System Redesign 
Project. 
From 1985-1986 I worked with Professor Alan Westin (Columbia University) 
on an OTA project to closely examine the history of system development at the 
Social Security Administration (1935-1990). 
From 1986 to 1991 Professor Westin and myself have been supported by the 
National Science Foundation in a project to comparatively examine the history of 
system development at the three largest system development agencies in the U.S. 
Government (FBI, SSA, and IRS). This work is on-going. 
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CIOs Beware: Very Large Scale Systems Projects 
In 1982 the Social Security Administration began a 500 million dollar, ten 
year program to rebuild its core information systems. A well known Big Eight 
accounting firm wrote the plan, and one of the country's most experienced systems 
integration companies was hired to manage the process. The project was touted as a 
flagship Reagan era example of how to do things right with modem computer 
technology, experienced business designers, and a powerful integration manager. 
New software, hardware, databases and communications were promised. 
By 1987 the project was cancelled with Congressional auditors claiming it 
was a failure, and SSA management claiming limited success. To be sure new 
hardware and telecommunications hardware was in place by 1987. But there was 
scant progress in writing new software or developing a modem database. By 
Congressional fiat employment at SSA had been squeezed down to 67,000 
employees from 78,000 in 1982. But complaints from employees were rising rapidly 
as the agency tried to demonstrate productivity gains from its technology 
investment. Worse, the way you and your parents actually obtain social security 
benefits is largely unchanged---citizens still had to trudge down to the local district 
office and fill out an application. 
The strategic story does not end here. As we describe later, from 1986-1989 
SSA was able to begin implementing a new vision of how to deliver social security 
services based on telephone service and powerful telecommunications facilities. 
The earlier investernents in hardware paid off handsomely by creating a 
technological platform from which to launch major organizational change. There 
are many lessons in the Social Security story for CIO's who are rebuilding VLSS. 
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As a consultant to the Office of Technology Assessment, I worked from 1985 
to 1986 trying to answer the 500 million dollar question on many Congressmen's 
mind: would SSA succeed in rebuilding its systems? After a year's work our team 
finally developed a consensus that, "No", SSA would most likely not succeed in the 
absence of a serious effort to change SSA's organizational culture and develop a 
new vision of how to do business in the 1990's.' 
After many months of investigation it became clear that the Big Eight 
Accounting firm and the experienced systems integrator had developed a plan to 
automate the existing procedures of SSA and had failed entirely to re-think how 
SSA should be doing business in the 1990's. The basic procedures of the agency, the 
business procedures built by the Social Security Administration of 1936, remained 
fundamentally unchanged in 1986. Of course, now these 1936 procedures are 
implemented on very fast state of the art computers. 
It was also clear that the 1982 senior management of the agency, 
management and systems personnel at the accounting firm and the systems 
integration firm, as well as Congressmen and their staffs, had seriously 
underestimated the complexity and cost of re-writing 12 million lines of computer 
code, and rearranging the basic files of SSA into a modern computer database. 
Few people--including ourselves-- understood in 1982 that SSA was dealing 
with a relatively new problem: rebuilding very large scale systems ( W S ) .  Few 
understood then that in order to take advantage of the new information 
technologies, one has to re-think completely the business procedures, rules, 
practices, and even values. Just as one has to design products for modern 
manufacturing, so to must one design business organizations for contemporary 
information technology. 
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After this experience we became more aware that many organizations in 
both the private and public sector were experiencing difficulties with very large scale 
systems rebuilding. [see boxes below for federal and private sector system 
examples]. 
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Some Infamous Government VLSS 
*The IRS has been rebuilding the tax transaction systems since 1978. 
Called by various names like the "new Tax Administration System," and 
the "Tax System Redesign," IRS has spent over a billion dollars trying to 
rebuild. A recent critical report by Congressional auditors found the new 
systems cannot last beyond the early 1990's and a U.S. Senate Finance 
Committee Chairman called the effort a 'Train Wreck" about to happen2 
*The FI3I has been trying to build a national electronic network to 
exchange criminal history records among the states for the last decade. 
After expending about one billion dollars, only ten states contribute 
records to the electronic files although all states request records from the 
system. 
*In 1983 the U.S. Patent Office awarded a $293 million 
19 year [sic] contract to Planning Research Corporation of McLean 
Virginia to rebuild the old patent storage and search system in which 
patent records are stored in wooden boxes. In 1989 the system was four 
years behind schedule, did not work at all, th completion cost estimate 
was $600 million, and the delivery date 1994. 3 
*The grand daddy of all system sink holes is of course the Department of 
Defense World Wide Military Command and Control System 
(WWMCCS--pronounced "Wirnmics). Under the careful management of 
the Air Force. This system was begun in 1966 as a federation of 158 
different computer systems using 30 different software systems at 81 
different locations. After one billion dollars in expenditures, and literally 
hundreds of studies, there is still no agreement on the architecture or 
information requirements! 
The system has been judged by the General Accounting Office to be a 
failure, with a management structure "so complex and fragmented that no 
one central organization or individual has a complete overview of the 
program.''4 
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Some Infamous VLSS in the Private Sector 
*A major insurance company started out in 1982 to re-build its policy 
issuance system from a batch system to an on-line system driven directly 
from the agents desktop computer. This would automate completely the 
process of issuing new policies, and permit the introduction of new types 
of products within one month as opposed to the traditional three years or 
SO. 
A well known systems integration firm was hired to develop software and 
install it on the firms hardware, as well as assume consulting and 
integration roles. The target date was 1987 and the price tag $8 million. 
The project s still not finished, the target date is 1993, and the price tag is 
$15 million. i 
*A major mini-computer manufacturer was well known for its chaotic 
order processing and billing system. In 1981 the company hired a small 
but well known consulting firm to rebuild the order entry system in 
cooperation with the MIS department. The original contract called for an 
18 month delivery and a price of 14 million dollars. In 1985 the project 
was finally cancelled and was costing 10 million a year in direct costs, plus 
indirect costs of customers lost due to faulty billing. 
*A major American Bank attempted to re-design the Bank's Employee 
Benefits and Tmst S e ~ c e s  Division. After several years of effort, a cost 
to the Bank of 45 million dollars, the project ended in failure in 1988.~ 
*A major Midwestern health care insurance provider hired a systems 
integrator to re-build the firms seven different claims processing systems 
and three different membership systems for $200 million dollars. The 
project was completed on schedule 18 months later but it did not work. 
The system created $60 million in overpayments and lost 35,000 customers 
before being unplugged. 
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A Private Sector Example: VLSS: MultiChem7s Experience 
MultiChem is an international manufacturer of chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
and dyestuffs, with 3 divisions and 20 operating units scattered throughout the 
U.S. It employs 20,000 employees of whom 7000 are unionized. Numerous 
acquisitions during the late 1970's could not be handled by the corporation's core 
Personnel information system, which had already been extensively modified and 
patched. 
The corporation embarked on an ambitious Grand Design to build a new 
Human Resources Information System that would automate all of the firm's 
Human Resources activities. In addition to providing on-line real-time personnel 
processing in a state-of-the art technical environment, the proposed system would 
automate all of the firm's Benefits plans, plus track positions and organizational 
relationships for manpower planning. 
The project never proceeded beyond the requirements-gathering stage 
because the organizational complexity was too overwhelming. There were 2 
major compensation evaluation systems, 32 pension plans, 70 insurance plans, 
and an Investment Savings Plan with complex securities valuations to automate. 
The old Personnel system had been designed to be a major supplier of employee 
data to other systems--Payroll, Benefits and the firm's Investment Savings Plan. 
These systems were linked by elaborate and often heavily manual interfaces, that 
were poorly documented and understoood. Twelve separate interfaces had to be 
constructed for the firm's disparate Payroll systems alone. In many instances the 
COBOL code from the old system had to be utilized to reconstruct fine-grained 
requirements because end-users overlooked many important details. 
Analysts from the project proposed streamlining the system by 
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"rationalizing" some of the firm's plans and procedures--consolidating pension 
plans, reducing the number of Insurance plans, forcing all operating units to use 
the same Payroll system. But senior management refused, fearing ''political" 
backlash from profitable acquisitions and operating units that insisted on doing 
things their way. After four years and expenditures of over $5 
million, the project had only produced a prototype for positions tracking, a 
pension processing system that didn't work, and three thousand pages of design 
specifications. The project was cancelled. Senior management insisted that 
Human Resources develop a strategic business plan before any new systems 
projects proceed. 
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What is it about very large scale systems that causes them to fail in the first 
place? Why can't VLSS systems keep operating forever? Why--in this day and age-- 
are VLSS so difficult to rebuild? What are the strategic options to consider when 
rebuilding VLSS? How can senior management be sure that the right questions 
have been asked and the right direction chosen? 
Back to Basics: What is a VLSS? 
At the outset it is important to see that VLSS are fundamentally a different 
kind of system from the normal run-of-the-mill, nickel and dime computer system. 
Unfortunately, the existing academic literature makes little or no distinction 
between a VLSS behemoth involving 200-300 systems personnel, millions of lines of 
code, and a ten year development trajectory and a new sales management system 
with twenty system personnel, 10,000 lines of code, and a one year development 
path.7 
There are two kinds of definitions of VLSS. Technical definitions describe 
VLSS in terms of lines of code, the number of computer hours required to process 
the application, the number of daily transactions, the number of records, files, and 
so forth. While interesting and useful once other problems are solved, technical 
definitions generally fail to grasp the essence of VLSS. 
Technical definitions tend to produce technical solutions such as CASE tools 
(Computer Aided System Engineering), programmer workbenches, and purchasing 
more computer and cornrnunications hardware. Generally, these technical 
solutions are peripheral to the problem, but they are nevertheless extremely 
popular. Armed with slogans like "software engineering," managers are misled in 
the belief that they are attacking the problem with modern to01s.~ 
A second type of definition is organizational. In olganizational definitions 
VLSS have the following characteristics: 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-94-06 
. *VLSS play a dominant role in shaping the organizational metaphor of 
production and service delivery. Unlike technical and managerial systems of 
the 60's and 70's, VLSS play a much larger role in the culture of corporate 
life [see illustration]. 
Picture: "VLSS and Organizations" 
Caption: Unlike earlier systems which effected relatively few people or 
procedures in an organization, VLSS play a dominant role in the day-to- 
day business practices of most employees. VLSS are expressions of the 
firm's culture. 
*VLSS are deeply embedded in the thousands of day-to-day organizational 
procedures. VLSS are the standard operating procedures. These systems are 
in every sense a strategic asset to the company by creating comparative 
advantages that are hard to duplicate. But as we describe later, VLSS can 
become strategic liabilities as they age. 
*VLSS directly control the information flow of central "core" activities in the 
organization. [See illustration] 
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Picture: "Core" Organizational Activities, Spin-offs, and Systems" 
Caption: All organizations develop a central institutional "core" over time--a 
collection of products, activities, and services which are the predominant focus of 
organizational life. Supporting each core activity are Very Large Scale Systems. 
These VLSS have developed over decades. The software and files of VLSS 
reflect the predominant business metaphor: what products are made and how, 
who is the customer, and how is product distributed. 
Over long periods of time, organizations develop "spin offs" from the central core 
in blips, drabs, and major trickles. VLSS take on additional complexity as they 
strive to support these spin-offs. 
Eventually VLSS become overburdened with "patched on" support activities, and 
*VLSS directly involve the vast majority of the employees. 
* U S  involve powerful organizational units. Therefore VLSS are bound up 
in the politics of the organization. 
*VLSS are intellectually complex because of shear size and because no one 
individual, or small group of individuals, can adequately understand them. 
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Knowledge of the system is widespread, but inherently not collective, 
systematic, or shared. 9 
An Example of VLSS Complexity 
SSA operates with a Program Operations Manual of approximately 40,000 
pages. One can think of this manual as the definitive standard operating 
procedures for SSA because it expresses all the formal, legal rules for arriving at 
SSA eligibility and payments. 2,000 pages are changed each month and 40,000 
field employees attempt to keep up with these monthly changes. 
Much of the 40,000 pages in the Program Operations Manual is bound up 
in the 12 million lines of SSA software code which issues SSA numbers, tracks 
earnings, establishes eligibility, and retains the master beneficiary records. 
- 
In organizations like these, much of what is done and can be done on a daily 
basis is shaped by the capabilities and performance of their VLSS. In VLSS, there is 
a "tight couple" between business procedure and strategies, and the firms VLSS 
hardware, telecommunications, software, and database [see illustration]. 
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Picture: In a VLSS a "tightly coupled" relationship exists between an 
organization's business rules, procedures, personnel and strategies on the one 
hand, and the VLSS software, hardware, telecommunications, and database on 
the other hand. 
These social definitions of VLSS grasp the complexity of the p~oblem but 
tend --as we see below-- not to lead to any clear cut, decisive, or clean "solutions." 
There are no quick "tech~lical ftues" for the problems raised by re-building VLSS. 
Organizational definitions tend to support unpopular, painful, long term, and 
difficult solutions to the problem of U S .  Many organizations do not survive but 
there are ways to prepare. 
How Many VLSS Are There? 
Virtually all Fortune 1000 firms more than 10 years old have at least one 
VLSS, many have a collection of such systems. Peat Marwick Mitchell and Co. has 
built a 35 million dollar a year business rebuilding VLSS. It surveyed 600 of its 
clients in 1987 and found that most had at least one VLSS, and that 35% of the 
firms had at least one "runaway" VLSS rebuilding project in which a VLSS Project 
was years behind schedule and millions over budget.10 
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m e r e  do VLSS Come From? 
Most organizations do not live long enough to experience the pain of having 
to rebuild VLSS. Briefly, a VLSS which evolved in the 1960's, or even the 1950 '~~  
can live on and provide support for an organization indefinitely so as long as the 
environment of the organization does not materially change. Because the average 
life span of a business organization is less than ten years, the original VLSS are 
usually sufficient to last the lifetime of the 
Ironically, it is only the small number of very successful organizations who 
live longer than ten years who experience the pain of having to rebuild VLSS. 
Almost all VLSS evolve over long periods of time and virtually no historically 
existing VLSS more than five years old were "built" in the sense of being the result 
of singular, conscious, intentional, organizational efforts to produce a "system". As it 
turns out, this fact provides a critical insight into how to successfully rebuild VLSS 
described below. 
The airlines reservation systems, and virtually all actual "strategic" systems 
about which we know, evolve over long periods of time. VLSS evolve in spurts, and 
in patches, as they respond to more and more unplanned demands to expand so that 
new activities can be supported. Not until the 1980s are VLSS being rebuilt as a 
part of well structured plans.12 
The evolutionary character of W S  means that over time they accrue new 
unplanned functions; their internal structure becomes a lattice work of 
interdependencies, most completely undocumented. Early designers retire, and late 
comers know only specific functions of the system. An overall perspective on the 
VLSS is lost in the dim past. 
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Why do Existing VLSS Fail: Strategic Transitions 
Organizations usually rebuild VLSS when they are in a state of crisis. 
Because decision making in an organizational crisis is usually worse, and certainly 
no better, than in "normal times," the odds of managers making the right decisions 
during the crisis are slight.13 Indeed, because the existing lot of managers was at 
the helm as the crisis developed, they are often the least capable of solving the 
problem. 
The existing VLSS is usually not the cause of the crisis, but it is directly 
involved. Typically the organizational crisis occurs because the environment has 
shifted and no longer supports the organization. 
Deregulation, new competition, the appearance of new technology pursued 
vigorously by competitors, changing public tastes, and so forth are typical of the 
kinds of environmental changes and discontinuities which make existing business 
procedures, products, s e ~ c e s ,  and strategies irrelevant and no longer useful. 
In this environment of discontinuity, the old VLSS is typically stretched to its 
limits and is being asked to do impossible things. Most VLSS can do "impossible" 
things, things never intended, by virtue of dedicated staff willing to work on week 
ends and nights. 
But eventually not even these crisis tactics work. Doubts rise concerning 
whether the system can perform even the simple, basic functions like cutting checks, 
tracking sales, inventory control, and processing of orders. 
Faced with this crisis, organizations must come up with new procedures, 
business rules, and indeed an entire new organizational metaphor of what they do. 
What is needed is a new vision of how to do business, what to produce, how to 
deliver the product or service, and how to use new information technology to 
support the new vision. Needless to say, the organization will have to rebuild its 
VLSS to support the new business. We can call this period a strategic transition. 
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Why Don't Managers Rebuild VLSS Before the Crisis? 
In most VLSS failures, managers see the crisis develop long before it 
happens. There is almost always a long lead time from the first signs of trouble in a 
VLSS to its ultimate collapse. Researchers have found that it takes at least five 
years, often longer, to really kill off an organization.14 This leads to the question, 
"Why don't managers and organizations do something before the storm hits?" 
Because organizations are so dependent on VLSS, and because they are so 
immensely complex, expensive, and troublesome, most rational managers and most 
short term rational organizations will avoid rebuilding them in any serious way 
unless absolutely necessary. 
In most organizations the managerial incentive structure is not supportive of 
rebuilding VLSS. In general, VLSS rebuild projects take from 5-10 years. In this 
time frame, managers who start the painful rebuild are rarely around to reap the 
rewards. Those who come on the project late are liable to be blamed for the likely 
failure. Hence most politically astute managers will avoid the assignment. In other 
words, VLSS have a different life cycle than managers. 
The organizational incentive structure is also not supportive. At the 
organizational level, truly immense investments are required over long periods of 
unpredictable time and the rewards--if any-- usually cannot be calculated in any 
believable way. It's a roll of the dice. Most large rational organizations will avoid 
rolling the dice. 
What happens when VLSS Fail? 
Because VLSS are so entwined with the value chain of activities, and the 
value chains of suppliers and customers, rebuilding them is inherently risky. Small 
mistakes can amplify throughout the chain of related activities, drastically effecting 
suppliers, and customers, not to mention one's own organization. 
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Patches of existing systems rather than rebuilds are the typical response to 
the first signs of trouble. Patches are politically acceptable because they require no 
great organizational change. 
Why the Old Systems Development Life Cycle Won't Work 
One of the most dangerous pitfalls to avoid in this situation is to turn to the 
tried and true techniques developed in the 1950's for building systems. Called the 
"systems development life cycle", this traditional technique calls for systems people 
to study the old information system, investigate the "information requirements" of 
the organization, and design a rational solution. 
This all sounds good until you get down into the trenches. For instance, 
there are no requirements statements on the old system, there is no book where you 
can find out how the old system works--its all in the heads of thousands of people 
because as the VLSS grew over the years no one really documented the system. 
This means you often have to look at 100,000 lines of code to figure out what is 
happening in the system. 
If we assume that one skilled-programmer analyst can understand and 
document about 20 lines of code per day (a generous assessment and about the 
same as he could write new code), and if we assume a W S  with say 2 million lines 
of code, then it would take a team of twenty programmers about 21 years just to 
figure out how the old system works! If we triple the productivity of 
prograrnrner/analysts from current levels (something nobody even envisages 
actually happening with CASE tools), then the task would only take seven years. By 
that time of course, the organization will be dead. 
For instance, one large government agency hired a very prestigious 
accounting firm to conduct a so-called "enterprise wide information analysis" of how 
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the agency's existing 1982 systems worked, and what information requirements the 
old system fulfilled. The study itself took two years and three million dollars. It took 
the agency another year to develop a statement of what the requirements were for 
the old organization. After three years, no one could understand the information 
requirements statement, however, because it took up thirty feet on a book shelf! 
The study has remain unused as the agency later decided to develop entirely new 
systems based on contemporary views of how to conduct business. The old ways of 
business--and their information requirements--were essentially irrelevant. 
Briefly, the intellectual complexity of existing VLSS are so great, that several 
years will be required just to understand them in some formal sense. By that time it 
is often too late, and it is almost always irrelevant to know how ancient business 
practices were performed with outdated computer technology. 
The idea that VLSS evolve overlong periods of time is a critical insight here 
because it means that just about any intentional or conscious plan to re-build such 
systems will be simplistic, even naive, and fail to capture the full functionality of the 
existing VLSS. Imagine designing a complex biological entity--say a plant--given a 
hundred thousand or so genes. 
Second, there's a difference between "doing something according to plan" 
and "creating the conditions for something to grow and flourish." In the traditional 
systems development life cycle, we try to do something according to plan. This is a 
civil engineering technique suitable for bridging gaps across rivers with bridges. 
The nice thing about land masses is that they don't change much in the short 
term of a few centuries. But the civil engineering analogy may be inappropriate to 
information systems. Information systems have to be built for uncertain future 
environments which change in a few months, or years. 
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Biological analogies--as opposed to civil engineering metaphors-- may 
provide a better to guide to choosing a proper VLSS rebuilding strategy. What we 
need is a systems development life cycle methodology which can evolve flexible 
robust systems over, say, ten year time frames. 
What we need to start with is a vision of how to do business five or ten years 
from now, and build for that future environment. Where can we get that vision? 
Let's examine the realistic choices facing senior management. 
What are the re-building strategies? 
We need to consider three dimensions: the organization, the technology, and C Q15 4 
strategy [see box]. 
Picture: Policy Matrix. 
Caption: All VLSS rebuilding strategies can be analysed using a three dimension 
policy matrix. 
We can understand any strategy chosen better by placing it in this three 
dimensional space. All VLSS rebuilding strategies involve some change in 
organizational structure and process--some more than others. All strategies involve 
some change in the technology platfonn--the collection of computers, 
telecommunications, and databases. 
The strategies themselves have different characteristics of risk, reward, and 
resistance (popularity). In general, as we move out the strategy vector, risk 
increases but so does reward (effectiveness). Unfortunately, resistance increases as 
well. Lets examine six common W S  strategies using this matrix. 
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Feasibili~ study 
In the short term a low risk possibility is to spend six months to a year 
studying the problem. Sometimes inaction is the best action. Some problems do go 
away, others solve themselves, and others simply need a new crew of managers and 
professionals which takes time. If you can afford inaction for a year, you should try 
to identify the precise nature of the VLSS problem: people, technology, and 
organization. 
- 
Let's Go Shopping 
The most common short term survival strategy is to go shopping for the 
biggest, fastest, and most powerful mainframe machines available. In the trade this 
is called the "unlimited MIPS" or "Big Iron" strategy and it is of course a favorite 
among systems people, all technology lovers, vendors of mainframes, as well as most 
system integrators. Generally, this strategy involves minimal organizational change, 
sometimes significant technology platform change, and moderate short term 
effectiveness with low risk. 
On the positive side this strategy buys time for large "embedded base" 
systems in a state of crisis. As a survival strategy, bigger machines can process the 
old software and the old files as much as ten times faster, relieving backlogs, 
unclogging communications channels, and increasing service to customers. 
Moreover, this strategy fits in with a manager's life cycle: a "turnaround of sorts can 
be produced in 18 months to 3 years. 
On the down side this strategy involves a tremendous financial commitment 
to the old software, the old business procedures embedded in the software, and the 
entire business metaphor of the past. If you want to be doing business 5 to 7 years 
from now (the expected life of "new" systems) the same way you do business now, 
then this is the strategy for you. Many years from now you will find yourself locked 
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into a centralized, mainframe architecture, operating software now twenty years old, 
with little capability to accommodate changes in the market place. 
Salami: one bite at a time. 
One approach to large systems is to cut them up into smaller systems. The 
idea behind salami is to break up huge VLSS into component parts, and rebuild the 
parts one at a time. This strategy recognizes that "Big Iron" is not itself the answer 
and that some serious redesign of the business is in order. At the same, salami 
recognizes that most businesses do not have a comprehensive vision of how they 
want to do business in the future, and even if they did, it would be too risky to try to 
implement the entire vision all at once. Better to break up the problem into 
"natural" parts---like sales, marketing, production, etc.--and do the easy parts first. 
Generally, salami strategies emphasize change in technology platforms. 
Within specific functional areas--like sales--salami tactics can produce important 
though limited organizational changes. 
The advantage of salami is that it focuses scarce personnel and system 
resources on a small part of the problem for maximum effect. Most VLSS really are 
too big to attempt a single planned rebuild. With salami, interim deliverable targets 
can be met, resources can be minimized, and personnel have a chance to learn by 
doing as they explore new technology and business design principles in limited 
areas. The damage done by errors with salami is less than with more ambitious 
designs. While slow to deliver completed VLSS--it may take ten years--eventually 
the firm arrives. 
The disadvantages of salami follow from its virtues--there is a distinct 
prospect that in five years you will end up with some high tech parts that cannot be 
tied together, which do not share data, and that are built according to different 
principles learned over time. The result is a garden of applications which do not fit 
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together. However, fitting things together can be someone else's problem, and 
salami is therefor a popular, reasonable sounding strategy, which produces results 
according to schedule. 
Hire out: somebody knows how. 
Increasingly organizations faced with rebuilding their own VLSS turn to 
outside consultants and system integrators. The fastest growing segment of the 
computer service industry--as major accounting firms have demonstrated--is systems 
integration. In large part this is due to the problems faced by the Fortune 1000 in 
rebuilding their VLSS. 
Many CIOs have decided that the internal system staff is overwhelmed just 
operating the existing systems, or they simply lack the skills to be build 
contemporary systems appropriate to the future ten years. Many times the 
organization does not have a "grand vision" to implement, and no one in the 
organization has any idea about how to do business five or ten years from now. 
Therefore, proponents argue, turning to outsiders who are skilled, experienced, and 
creative is a wise move, 
Generally, the most skilled programrner/analysts, systems analysts, and 
system designers end up working for the systems integrators simply because the 
salaries are so high. Moreover, these skilled persons have been exposed to a much 
wider variety of technologies and organizations than your own staff. On the 
surface, pursuing this strategy seems to lower the risk presented by internal 
development of systems, and seems to offer the best opportunity for developing 
state of the art systems suited for the future decade. 
System integrators usually do not understand the specifics of your firm, and 
often times do not undertand the dynamics of your own industry especially if there 
experience is developed in other industries. For this reason, system integrators tend 
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to be excellent at managing technical platform changes but they do poorly when it 
comes to organizational process change. As one CIO noted based on his experience 
with a well known system integrator, "They were fine when we told them to run the 
data center. The "took the Data Center like real Marines--which many of them 
were. But when we asked them to think, when we asked them to integrate closely 
the tens of sub-projects, or when we asked them to take a critical look at the 
direction we were moving, they did miserably." 
Unfortunately, success with external system integrators and accounting firms 
as VLSS rebuilders is no higher than flipping a coin and there are as many disaster 
stories as success stories. 
The problems are multiple and serious. The insight of system integrators 
into the future of your business and industry is usually no better than yours, and 
often worse. Hence, system integrators cannot be relied on to do your thinking. 
Integrators typically cannot transfer skills to your staff, so you will be dependent on 
them forever. Your staff tends to resent outside integrators and consultants, and 
miscommunication or non communication grows as the project proceeds. If you 
think managing a large project is difficult, imagine what it is like when the staff is 
fighting with outside consultants, and communication of any helpful sort is non- 
existent. 
If you are dissatisfied with the results of system integrators, you tend to be 
locked in--afterall, they are the only one's who really "know your system." 
Experience has found that external system integrators are no better estimating 
ultimate costs or delivery schedules than your own staff--which is miserable. 
Despite its growing popularity, reliance on external problem solvers exposes 
you to a great deal of risk, at a high cost, and diminishes the development of your 
own staff. You may get a system, but it will almost certainly be over budget and 
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behind schedule, and you will not have created the conditions for growing powerful, 
robust systems in the future. 
Grand Design: Let's do it right. 
Grand design is the most serious VLSS rebuild strategy if only because it is 
the most ambitious, expensive, and risky of all the strategies. The rewards of grand 
design can be significant although a long time in coming (more than five years). 
These characteristics make grand design highly desirable to managers who 
appreciate taking risks, and to vendors of hardware and software equipment. Other 
organizational players tend to resist grand design because it promises to bring 
significant organizational change. 
Grand design is the only strategy that correctly diagnoses a major part of the 
problem: there is an intimate connection between the basic metaphor of the 
business, the day to day procedures, and the business VLSS. You cannot change 
one without changing the others. Second, in order to seriously rebuild VLSS taking 
maximum advantage of contemporary technology, you will need to change the 
software, and databases, as well as the hardware and telecommunications. Third, a 
major redesign of the business strategy and procedures will be required both to 
drive the system rebuilding process as well as to simplify the traditional practices. 
Briefly, a new vision is needed of what the business is all about and how to do it. 
Grand designr imply a "frame breaking" change in the business. 
Grand design exercises the talents of strategic planners, CEO's who like to 
make strategic plans, and organizational staffers who like carrying out detailed plans 
over long periods. More than any other strategy, Grand design promises to "do it 
rightn--to build integrated, state of the art systems which are carefully crafted to 
support a future vision of the business. In the few cases where grand design has 
worked, the results have been spectacular. 
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Unfortunately, most grand designs are not successfully implemented. 
Redesigning the business procedures, rules, and strategies, while at the same time 
trying to redesign the support software, databases, hardware, and 
telecommunications, proves to be a totally overwhelming task for corporate staffs no 
matter how big and no matter what technique of planning or technology of planning 
is used. In the absence of clear-cut information requirements (which cannot be 
given because the business design is not yet solidified in the minds of planners), 
systems people tend to overcompensate by buying more of whatever hardware is 
available just in case it might be needed. 
The end result of grand design is usually a new collection of hardware--that 
afterall is the easy part of systems. When it comes to software and data, the end 
result is typically busted budgets and products not delivered as described in the early 
part of this paper. Because all that works is the new hardware running the old 
software, that tends to be what is accomplished. 
A federal study of grand designs in government found that senior 
management often did not understand the commitment of time and effort required, 
that staff was often not available or not skilled to carry out the plan, and that it was 
impossible to coordinate all the organizational players. [see panel for top ten 
problems] 
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Leading Problems of Grand Design Strategies 
Problem Total* 
1. Top management lack of understanding 34.3 
2. Staffing problems 32.8 
3. Lack of acquisition skills 29.0 
4. Protests from contractors 28.6 
5. Problems that occur when falling behind 28.3 
6. Coordination problems 28.1 
7. Inappropriate organizational placement 27.6 
8. Audits by GAO 27.4 
9. Problems with procurement regulations 27.4 
10. Unrealistic time schedules set by others 26.6 
*Survey of 21 senior federal managers involved in the design and installation of 
10 Grand Design federal systems. Respondents were asked to score the problem 
in four areas (planning, procurement, implementation, and operation) on a 10 
point scale (1 =not very important, 10 = extremely important). The scores were 
totalled across the four areas. The maximum possible score in each problem area 
is 40, the minimum possible is 4. 
Source: Francis A. McDonough, "An Evaluation of the Grand Design Approach 
to Developing Computer Based Application Systems," United States General 
Services Administration, Information Resources Management Service, 
September 1988. 
The problems of grand design are typically complicated by the on-going 
organizational crisis--as described earlier-- of which the VLSS is a significant part. 
Enormous hopes and considerable pressure is placed on system designers who are 
often seen as the technological messiahs who will deliver the firm into a healthy 
future. Drastic measures are sometimes implemented, like appointing a systems 
Czar (or in the Federal Government a "Trail Boss") to "take command" of the 
situation. 
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What Can Be Done? 
Organizations typically go into and out of focus in terms of systems planning 
over long periods--say 20 years. They fluctuate back and forth from one strategy to 
another, some working, others not. [see box for history of SSA strategy].15 
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SSAys Strategy History 
SSA went through a fascinating historical cycle of W S  strategies. What 
emerged was never planned, although current plans now support what has 
emerged. 
As the 1960's equipment and software broke down and deteriorated in the 
1970's, in resulting from Congressional and executive branch failure to 
understand the need for modernization, SSA planners in 1978 proposed a grand 
design approach called Future Process. 
Future Process sought to totally transform the paper based agency into a 
contemporary on-line data base organization. In this plan, regional processing 
centers would be radically changed into electronic storehouses, and 1300 district 
offices would offer telephone service to clients. However, this plan generated so 
much opposition from Operations Management and Field Staffs, who feared the 
impending changes, that it was dropped. 
In 1979, a new Commissioner who was formerly a career officer in the Navy 
proposed a salami strategy: divide SSA into four main bundles of activity, and 
sub-contract each bundle separately in isolation from the others. This strategy 
was opposed by leading members of Congress, the Federal Data Processing 
establishment at General Services Administration, and both systems and 
operations people at SSA who knew the future required linkages among the 
various parts of SSA. The Commissioner soon left the agency. 
In 1982, with machines literally breaking down and threats of interruptions 
to the stream of 40 million checks each month, SSA proposed a "technical 
solution" called the Systems Modernization Plan. The cost was 500 million dollars 
over five years and sought to buy new hardware and rebuild the software and 
data files. 
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While it promised new software and databases, the SMP plan resulted in 
1987 after five years in new, faster, more powerful central mainframes in 
Baltimore and 25,000 desktop terminals connected to a new data 
communications system. As noted earlier, not changed in the way SSA conducted 
business with 40 million beneficiaries. 
In 1986 a new Commissioner was appointed, Congress threatened to 
withhold funding for SMP because of lack of progress on software, and this 
forced a "refocussing" period on SSA. In response, SSA withdrew SMP and put 
forth a new plan called the Agency Strategic P l m  2000. 
At first glance, this new plan appears to be in the best traditions of a real 
Grand Design: a new way of doing business is defined, one 'largely based on 
electronic interactions with citizens. A ten year, multi billion dollar effort is 
contemplated. 
But oddly, much of the new plan is already operating although some parts 
require still more hardware. From 1986 to 1989 SSA refocused its software 
efforts recognizing that it had seriously underestimated in 1982 the time and cost 
of rewriting 12 million lines of code. SSA managers also realized, as outside I 
consultants and Congressional researchers had been arguing, that a new vision of I 
how to run the agency was needed, a vision based on new models of doing 
business--800 telephone service, ATM like cards, reach out programs to clients 
like private insurance companies, electronic interaction with clients, and so forth. 
SSA management has successfully implemented a new on-line, interactive, 
telecommunications driven customer support service which processes much of the I 
work involved in its largest program--RSI (Retirement and Survivors Insurance). 
In the end, SSA managers pulled off one of the more remarkable 
transformations of a VLSS. A paper oriented, batch processing organization is I 
now well on its way to becoming a contemporary on-line, telecommunications I 
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oriented service agency. The transformation required seven years, somewhere 
between 500 million to one billion dollars (depending on how one counts and 
where one stops counting), the efforts of a 2000 person systems staff, and a large 
group of Congressional critics and private consultants (sometimes estimated by 
SSA senior management to be equal in size to the systems staff). 
Most important, the transformation was much more evolutionary than 
anticipated. Contemporary plans for the future are much more evolutionary than 
earlier plans. Real organizational learning has occurred. 
Of course most organizations would have expired under this load. SSA 
benefitted from the fact that American society would not let SSA die regardless 
of conservative attempts to kill it off, or because of shear incompetence. 
I SSA's transformation did not proceed according to plan, but it did proceed, I I and it did achieve a desirable result. In many respects, the goals of the original 1 
rejected Future Process plan of 1978 have finally been achieved. 1 
If we look back historically at W S  rebuild efforts there seem to be two 
kinds of risks to avoid. One nasty risk to avoid is a technology shopping spree which 
locks the business into an information architecture for the next decade. This 
strategy offers a solution, but one which can be fatal in the long run. A second nasty 
risk is trying to do everything at once--a grand design. Here are two simple ways to 
avoid both pitfalls. 
Make the problem big enough to solve 
The best way to avoid succumbing to technical solutions is to ask you and 
your staff to spend some considerable time thinking about the problem. In most 
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cases of VLSS failure, the failure is the result of a long term pattern of decline in 
technology, a growth in organizational complexity, and a decline in staff skills and 
morale. People and organizational problems are just as important as technology 
problems. You must discover what the people and organizational problems are 
before permitting technology solutions to run away with budgets and schedules. 
A good place to look for organizational problems is in the very design of the 
production and service delivery process. Often what happens is that a cumbersome, 
complex, and error prone set of organizational procedures inherited from the 
distant past becomes entrenched in the business, and existing systems have 
attempted to automate these manual procedures. 
For instance, at the Social Security Administration there was an initial failure 
in 1982 to rethink business procedures. Existing software was written to support a 
manual paper process invented in 1936. New machines were purchased in the 1982- 
1985 period in order to make the old software work faster. The result was that in 
1986--four years and 400 million dollars after the project began--the 1936 business 
practices of SSA were indeed more efficient, but service to the public, productivity, 
and staff morale was not markedly higher. 
From 1986 to 1989 SSA refocused its efforts using teleprocessing and 
telephone service as the vision of the future SSA. It wrote software to support this 
new vision and ultimately succeeded by 1989 in establishing a modem, interactive, 
telecommunications based business interface with the public. 
Most private companies do not have the luxury of 400 million dollar budgets. 
In the private sector, a mistake in defining the problem as merely technological may 
very well mean the death of the firm. The historical lesson of VLSS is clear: if you 
throw MIPS and hardware at the existing procedures, if you fail to simplify the 
business procedures first before designing new VLSS, if you fail to develop a new 
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vision of how to do business in the next decade, most of the potential efficiency 
gains of new technology will be lost. 
The poor track record of information technology in the service sector to 
markedly increase productivity is one indication that many firms have thrown 
considerable computer resources at problems but not achieved the productivity 
gains that they anticipated.16 
Opportunism and the Evolution of VZSS 
You may not have the l m r y  to redesign or rethink the business in the short 
term. SSA and most large businesses cannot stop existing systems to rethink the 
business. There is an immediate crisis often which needs a solution. What can be 
done in this situation? 
You should make use of the fact that most VLSS evolve over long periods of 
time, and you should prepare yourself for an immediate survival strategy. SSA's 
strategic history is instructive [see box]. SSA's new W S  required seven years to 
evolve and followed a survival tactic which involved enormous hardware investment 
in the old software just to survive. But the same computer and telecommunications 
hardware needed to survive could be used to operate more sophisticated and much 
better software which supported an entire new way of doing business in the future. 
No doubt serendipity and plain luck played a role here as well as management 
insight. 
A large telecommunications firm followed a similar strategy. Faced with 
ancient software operating on saturated, aging machines, this firm employed a 
survival tactic similar to SSA's: it isolated the old files and software in a "core" 
database, purchased enormous computing power to speed up transaction processing, 
and developed a user friendly front end which isolated applications developers and 
users from the core data and files [see box]. 
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Picture: Building An Envelope to Survive 
Caption: Building a survival envelope around existing files and software may buy 
enough time for the more difficult task of organization and system redesign. 
In other words, just to survive, this firm built an envelope around its traditional files 
and software. 
Now with survival assured, it is possible to evolve new business procedures 
and the underlying files and software to support them. But the process is expected 
to take more than five years, to proceed in an evolutionary and adaptive manner, 
according to a flexible plan which optimizes locally, and exploits advantages as they 
become apparent. 
While a great deal has been written about the strategic advantages available 
to firms who effectively use information technology, the historical evidence suggests 
as well that periodically systems become strategic liabilities. Huge embedded base 
systems developed to automate old business strategies and procedures become 
corporate loadstones. At moments of strategic transitions in an industry, these aging 
VLSS can contribute to further decline. All Fortune 1000 firms who have survived 
the last decade have such systems. In the 90's we will have to learn how to rebuild 
these systems as we redesign our core business activities. 
1. My colleague in this work was Professor Alan F. Westin, Columbia University. 
The results of this work are forthcoming. See Alan F. Westin and Kenneth C. 
Laudon, Information Technology at the Social Security Administration, 1935-1990. 
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